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Summary  findings
The neoclassical theory of project evaluation is based on  preferences, plans made in 1998 would not be followecl
models in which agents discount the future at a constant  - because the low discount rate applied to returns in,
exponential rate. But there is strong empirical evidence  say, 2020,  will become a high discount rate as the year
that people discount the future hyperbolically, applying  2020 approaches.
larger annual discount rates to near-term returns than to  Since it makes sense to analyze only plans that will
returns in the distant future.  actually be followed, Cropper and Laibson characterize
This has led some policymakers to argue that, in  the equilibrium of an intertemporal  game played by an
evaluating programs with benefits spread over decades  individual who discounts the future hyperbolically.
(such as subway systems and abatement of greenhouse  Along an equilibrium consumption path, the individual
gases), a low long-term discount rate should be used. In  will behave as tlhough  he were discounting the future at a
fact, some economists have suggested that higher  constant  exponential rate.  The individual's consumption
discount rates be applied in the present and lower rates  path is, however, Pareto inferior: He would be better off
in the future.  if he could force himself to consume less and save more.
Cropper and Laibson demonstrate that this is  This provides a rationale  for government subsidization
incorrect.  of interest rates or, equivalently, lowering the required
The problem with hyperbolic discounting is that it  rate of return on investment projects.
leads to time-inconsistent plans - a person who  Although hyperbolic discounting provides a rationale
discounts the future hyperbolically will not carry out the  for lowering the required rate of return on investment
consumption plans he makes today.  projects, it does not provide justification for those who
Cropper and Laibson note that if social decisionmakers  seek to treat environmental projects differently from
were to use people's  1998 hyperbolic rates of time  other investment projects.
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The neoclassical theory of project evaluation (Arrow and Kurz, 1970) is based on models
in which agents discount the future at a constant exponential rate.  There is, however, strong
empirical evidence that people discount the iuture hyperbolically,  applying larger annual discount
rates to near-term returns than to returns in the distant future (Ainslie, 1992; Cropper, Portney
and Aydede, 1994).  In this paper we trace out the implications of hyperbolic preferences for
private investment choices and public policy
The immediate problem posed by hyperbolic discounting is that it leads to time-
inconsistent plans:  A person who discounts the future hyperbolically  will not carry out the
consumption plans he makes today. From today's perspective the discount rate between two
distant periods,  t  and  t+1, is  a long-term low discount rate.  But, when period t  arrives, the
individual will apply a short term high discount rate to consumption in period  t+1.  Because it
makes sense to discuss investment decisions only along consumption paths that will actually be
carried out, one must begin by characterizing time-consistent plans for a consumer with
hyperbolic preferences. This can be done by allowing the consumer's different temporal selves to
play a game and to analyze the equilibrium  of this game.
In the case of a finite-lived consumer with quasi-hyperbolic  preferences, the game has a
unique subgame perfect equilibrium,  which (as Arrow has conjectured) can be characterized by an
Euler equation similar to that in the Ramsey model. The consumption path that characterizes the
equilibrium of the hyperbolic consumer is thus observationally equivalent to the consumption path
1of a consumer who discounts the future-exponentially. Moreover, the consumption rate of
discount along this path should always equal the rate of return on capital.  This suggests that one
should discount future returns using the rate of return on capital, whether consumers have
hyperbolic or exponential preferences.
This is not, however, the end of the story. As Phelps and Pollak (1968) demonstrated
many years ago, the equilibrium of the game played by quasi-hyperbolic consumers is Pareto-
inefficient. Consumers in all years would be better off if they each saved more, but, absent a
commitment mechanism, this will never occur.  This implies that there is a role for government
policy when preferences are hyperbolic. Specifically,  the government can induce Pareto
improvements by subsidizing the return on capital or, equivalently, by lowering the required rate
of return on investment projects.  Calibration of the hyperbolic model implies that the magnitude
of this subsidy should be about two percentage points annually.
We hasten to add that this conclusion does not favor environmental projects vis-a-vis
other forms of investment. Hyperbolic preferences provide a motive for lowering the required
return on all capital investment projects because of the under-saving that occurs along the
hyperbolic equilibrium path, but do not favor one type of capital over another.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the
notion of hyperbolic preferences.  Section 2 describes the intertemporal game played by a
consumer with quasi-hyperbolic preferences and characterizes the equilibrium of that game.
Section 3 adds a government to the model of section 2 and section 4 concludes.
21. Hyperbolic Discounting and Its Consequences
The neoclassical theory of optimal growth assumes that people have stationary time
preferences: that the choice between two payoffs depends only on the absolute time interval
separating them.  There is, however, strong empirical evidence that people are more sensitive to a
given time delay if it occurs closer to the present than if it occurs farther in the future (Ainslie,
1992; Cropper, Portney and Aydede, 1994). In other words the discount rate that applies to near-
term consumption tradeoffs is higher than the discount rate that applies to long-term consumption
tradeoffs.  Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) present an axiomatic analysis of such preferences,
which implies a generalized hyperbolic discount function, i.e., a function of the form
(P(t)  = (1+at)"',  a,y  > 0.  (1)
As a - 0, (p(t) approaches the exponential function. When a is very large, p(t) approximates a
step function, implying that all periods after the first receive approximately equal weight.  For  a >
0,  q(t)  lies below the exponential function at low  t  and above it at high  t.
In what follows we approximate the hyperbolic function with a quasi-hyperbolic  function,
first proposed by Phelps and Pollak (1968) for intergenerational analysis and then applied by
Laibson (1997) for intrapersonal analysis. 'Specifically,  we examine a representative consumer
who lives T  periods and whose period-t self receives utility from the consumption sequence
(CO,C 1..... CT) according to
T-t
Ut(CO,C 1,...,CT)  = u(ct) + p  X 8iu(ct,i),  0 < P,6  < 1.  (2)
i=1
When  0 < J  < 1 the discount structure in (2) mimics  the qualitative properties of the hyperbolic
3function,  while  maintaining  most of the analytical  tractability  of the exponential  discount  function.
We shall  refer  to the discount  factors ( 1, p5,  p52,  p63  ......  } as quasi-hyperbolic.  Figure 1
graphs  the exponential  discount  function  for  6 = 0.97, the hyperbolic  discounting  function  with a
105 and  y  = 5x10 3, and the quasi-hyperbolic  discounting  function  with 3  = 0.6 and 5 = 0.99.
To illustrate  the time-inconsistency  problems  to which  quasi-hyperbolic  preferences  give
rise, consider  what happens  if self 0 chooses  the consumption  sequence (co,c 1 . ,cT) to
maximize  (2) subject  to the constraints  (3) and (4),
O<  ct<Wt  (3)
Wt., = R  (Wt - ct)  (4)
where Wt is period-t  wealth  and R is the gross  return on capital. As Strotz (1955) first pointed
out, the consumption levels (cl,c2,. . ,cT)  chosen by self 0  will not be followed by future selves
if they are free to choose their consumption  levels. From self O's perspective  the discount  rate
between  two distant  periods, t  and t+l, is a long-term  low discount  rate. But self t  will
discount  consumption  in period t+1 at a much  higher  rate. Self t  will,  therefore,  consume  more
and save  less  than self 0 would  have  chosen  for him.
To analyze  a set of consumption  plans  that all  future selves  would  actually  follow,  we
examine  the equilibrium  of an intertemporal  game  first analyzed  by Phelps  and Pollak (1968).
2.  The Equilibrium  of a Game  with Quasi-Hyperbolic  Consumers
Consider the decision problem of a consumer with a finite lifetime (t = 0, 1, . . ., T).
4Suppose that self t  of the consumer has control over the period-t  consumption decision. We
assume  that self t  observes  all past consumplion  levels  (co,CI,C 2,... . ,Ct-1) and current  wealth,  Wt,
and chooses consumption in period t, ct, subject to the budget constraint (3).  Self t +1  inherits
wealth  W,+ 1, according to equation (4), and similarly  chooses  ct+i. T:he  payoff that self t
receives is given by (2), where  u(c) is a member of the class of constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) utility functions
u(c) =(c'-P - l)(-p),  00>  p> O.  (5)
Consider now the equilibria of this game. As Laibson has shown (1996), when  T  is
finite, the game played by different temporal selves has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
Each self s equilibrium  consumption strategy is a linear function of its inherited wealth,
ct =  tWt, and the consumption path is characterized by
u'(ct) =  R6u'(ct+i)[t+i  (,-1) + 1],  (6)
where  k+  = Oct,+  (Wt+ 1,T)/8Wt-+. As  T - co, equation (6) converges to
u'(ct) = RWu'(ct+l)[R*  (P-1) + 1],  (6')
where  X  is the solution to the non-linear equation
=  I - (6R'-P)/P[P;*(P  1  ) +  1  ]l/P.  (7)
When  P = 1, equation (6') is identical to the condition that characterizes the optimal
consumption path in the Ramsey model. Even when 0i  # 1, there is still an observational
5equivalence result conjectured by Arrow, between the equilibrium  of the game with quasi-
hyperbolic preferences and the Ramsey model.  Specifically,  the consumption path corresponding
to (6') is identical to the consumption path generated by a Ramsey model in which utility is
discounted at the constant exponential rate  6 = 6[)* (f-1) + 1].
In contrast to the Ramsey model, however, the consumption path that characterizes the
game with quasi-hyperbolic preferences is not Pareto-efficient. As Phelps and Pollak (1968) first
pointed out,  all selves would be better off if they all consumed less than the equilibrium
consumption rate, but there is no mechanism  to guarantee that this strategy will be followed.'
The intuition behind this result is simple. While requiring self t  to save more lowers self t's
utility, requiring all other selves to save more raises self t's utility, and the second effect
dominates the first.  This suggests that it may be possible for the government to enact policies to
increase saving that will be Pareto-improving.
3.  Pareto-Improving Government Policies in a Quasi-Hyperbolic  World
In a world in which consumers can be made better off by lowering the fraction of wealth
'This can be seen as follows. Write self t's utility as a function of X:, the fraction of
wealth consumed in the long run:
Ut(k)  = U($Wt)  +  p6U(p(1_  ?* )RWt)  + p62U(X.  (I-  X  ) 2R2Wt)  + p63U(I(-  X_  ) 3R3Wt)+.
Phelps and Pollak showed that  aUt(Q)/O* < 0.
6that they consume, there are two ways that the government can improve welfare.  One is to
subsidize interest rates (raise R  to  R); the other is to penalize consumption. Laibson (1996)
focuses on both strategies.  Here we consider only interest rate subsidies.
We model the government as a sequence of players {0,1,2.,T}  who can tax
consumers and use the proceeds to subsidize iinterest  rates.  An essential feature of each
government is that it can implement policies only with a lag:  due to delays in the budget process,
government  t  picks the lump-sum tax in period t+l,  Tt+l,  and Rt+1 -R,  the interest rate subsidy
in period  t+l.2  The effect of this assumption is to give the government a commitment
technology.  The time  t  government cannot iinstantaneously  overturn the policies of the time  t-1
government.  In this way, the government is able to overcome the self control problem that
plagues consumers.
The goal of the government at time  t  is to maximize the well-being of self t.  The
government's policy instrument influences marginal  tradeoffs between periods  t+1  and  t+2.
Between  t+1  and  t+2  the time-t  government would ideally  like the consumption path to be:
u'(ct+i) = 6Ru'(ct+ 2),  (8)
where  R  is the unsubsidized marginal rate of transformation. Note that  ,3 does not appear in
this equation, as  6  is the relevant discount faLctor  between period t+1  and  t+2  from
government  t's perspective.  Equation (8) implies
2Since the consumers in this economy are not liquidity-constrained,  the timing of lump-
sum taxes is irrelevant.  We therefore focus cn the choice of interest rate subsidy.
7(CtJ/Ct+ 1 )P  =  SR.  (9)
The time  t  government can implement this path by choosing an interest subsidy k = kt+ 1 such
that the generalized Euler equation (with subsidized interest rate) is consistent with the
government's desired consumption path,
(ct+Ct1)=  R [k(R)(i-1)  + 1],  (10)
where  :(Ik)  is the value of  X: implied by equation (7) when  R  is replaced by k.  Equations
(9) and (10) jointly imply that the time  t  government picks IR such that
AR  = SR [*(I )(I-1) + 1].  (11)
This argument holds for all governments (i.e., for all times  t).  So, in equilibrium R  t+1  = R  for all
t Ž 0.
To solve explicitly for the interest rate subsidy as a function of model parameters, we rely
on the fact that  ct+,  =  X(k)Wt+,, for all s 2 1. Together with (4) this implies that
Ct+s+i/ct+s=  (1- x(R)) k.  (12)
Inserting (12) into (9) yields );(k)  as a function of R  and R,
[ (1- ?:(Ik))  f]pj= 6R,  (13)
which, together with (11) yields the interest rate subsidy as a function of model parameters,
R-R = [(I-P)(I-(5R'-P)/P]- R/J3.  (14)
8To illustrate the magnitude of the interest subsidy, we consider plausible values for the
parameters of the quasi-hyperbolic discount:ing  function, P  and  6,  the gross returns on capital,
R, and the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption, p.  Suppose that  p = 3 and
R = exp(.04), i.e., the gross return on capital is 4%.  The values  3  =  0.6 and  6 = 0.99  pictured in
Figure I are roughly consistent with empiric:al  evidence on intertemporal choices presented by
Ainslie  .(1992). Together, these parameters imply an interest rate subsidy of over two percentage
points (R-R = 0.02 1).
We note that this subsidy puts the economy on a Pareto-efficient path.  The equilibrium
path that arises in the game with government is identical to the consumption path that would be
chosen by self  0  if self  0  could commit all[  future selves. Note that on the equilibrium path
u'(ct) = 8Ru'(ct± 1)  for all t > 0.  This is exactly the equilibrium  path self 0  would like to
implement. Hence, the equilibrium path is lPareto-efficient,  as any perturbation to the path would
make self 0  worse off.
4.  Conclusions
When agents discount future utility of consumption using a quasi-hyperbolic  rather than an
exponential function, the equilibrium consumption path in the economy is no longer Pareto
efficient. All consumers would be better oif if they each saved more, but there is no way to
coordinate this behavior.  This suggests a role for government policy: By subsidizing interest
rates (reducing the required return on investment projects) the government can help to overcome
the self-control problem that results from hyperbolic preferences.
9As we noted in the introduction,  however,  this is not a pro-environment  result. It does
not justify  applying  a lower discount  rate to an environmental  project  (e.g., a reforestation
project)  than would  be applied  to the building  of a steel  mill. Are there assumptions  that would
justify such a practice? The answer  is yes. In a world of quasi-hyperbolic  preferences  one can
justify applying  a lower  discount  rate to environmental  projects  under  the following  conditions:
(1) The production  of environmental  services  (YE)  from an environmental  capital  stock (E), e.g.,
a forest,  is a separate  process  from the production  of private  output (Y) from private capital  (K)
(separability  in production). (2) The environmental  consumption  good (cE)  and the private
consumption  good (c) are imperfect  substitutes  in the utility  function  (separability  in
consumption).  (3) The government  controls  the rate of consumption  of the environmental  good
and, as is assumed  above, the government  can act only  with a lag--in  period t  it chooses the
amount  of the environmental  good that will  be consumed  in period t+I (c 5t+I). 3
Under  these conditions  one can show  that the government  will  choose to consume  a lower
3Formally, suppose  that:
Yt  = AtKta  O  < ct  < Kt  Kt = (1-d)Kt.,  + Yt  - ct
yEt = AtEa  O < CEt  < E-t  E,t  = (ldEt  YE1td)  -cE  t
T-t
The preferences  of self t  and government t  are given  by v(cEt,ct)  + 13 Y. 6iv(cEt+i,ct+i).
i=l
10fraction of the environmental capital stock than consumers will choose to consume out of private
capital, and that the steady-state rate of return on environmental capital will lie below the return
on private capital.  Thus, a lower discount rate should be applied to environmental projects than
to private investments.  The intuition behind this result is as follows:  As long as the government
can act only with a lag, it is prevented from over-consuming the environmental good, as
consumers are tempted to do in the case of a private good.  Furthermore, because of the assumed
lack of substitutability between the environmental  good and other goods, both in production and
in consumption, consumers cannot undo the government's choices.
This result is, however, a fragile one: it will fail to hold if any one of the three
assumptions listed above is violated. In particular, if there is substitutability in production or
consumption between the environmental good and other goods, the same rate of return will apply
to both environmental and non-environmental capital. This underscores the main point of this
paper.  While hyperbolic discounting provides a rationale for lowering the required rate of return
on investment projects, it does not provide  justification for those who seek to treat environmental
projects differently from other investment projects.
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